I their factual update CSB is not very factual about the outcome of the accident, but state "the release fatally injured an employee and his wife". CSB shy away from mentioning the impact on the family of the dead parents, and hence fail to communicate the impact of this process safety accident on the survivors. Hence the public don't get the full story of this process safety incident. Also the lawyers suing Aghorn and related companies shy away from stating the obvious, that Jacob - the father - and Natalee - the mother - of three children were killed by a process safety accident.

How many facilities like this one in the Odessa, TX area have insufficient process safety?

The CSB factual update establish the following facts about this process safety accident:

1. At 18:38 on October 26, 2019 a high oil level alarm was registered on the control board in the pump house.

2. At 18:43 on October 26, 2019 an automatic phone notification was triggered to Aghorn employee Jacob Dean.

3. The employee drove to the pump house to determine the cause of the alarm.

4. The employee entered the pump house, and was killed by the hydrogen sulfide in the pump house.

5. Around 21:30 on October 26, 2019 Jacob's wife Natalee drove to the pump house in her personal car with her two youngest children, while the older teenager stayed at home.

6. The wife entered the pump house, and was killed by the hydrogen sulfide in the pump house.

7. At 21.58 on October 26, 2019 emergency responders received a call about a possible man down and dispatched an ambulance.

8. At the pump house the emergency responders notice a smell around the pump house, leading them to believe there was hydrogen sulfide inside the pump house.

9. While relocating to a safe location the emergency responders noticed a child in the back seat of Natalee's car.

10. At a safe location an emergency responder put on protective gear including self-contained breathing apparatus, and returned to Natalee's car, and rescued the two children.

11. Emergency responders did not see the hydrogen sulfide warning ligth on top of the pump house building.

An important finding from this sample was, that many cases would NOT have been detected from operational technology network monitoring as these were control system cyber incidents. This is a clear cry for training the control system engineers to question when incidents happen if they could be cyber-related. This becomes very important as sophisticated hackers can, and have, made cyber attacks look like equipment malfunctions, e.g. Stuxnet.

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This CSB video shows the importance of performing a hazard analysis as required by the MoC - Management of Change procedures, when a plant is shutdown and equipment is isolated without being emptied. The exploding tank was a 100,000 gallon foul condensate tank. The foul condensate was mostly water contained small amount of terpentine and sulfur compound. In the tank the water and terpentine separated with the later creating a terpentine layer on top of the water, which would normally be skimmed off and recovered. However, due uncertainty about who was responsible for this operation, that had not been done for several months prior to the shutdown, and hence the tank contained all the terpentine for this period. After isolation of the tank the content cooled, a vacuum relief valve, which was designed to protect the tank from collapsing under vaccum, opened and let air into the tank, thus creating an explosive atmosphere of air and terpentine vapor. Somehow the tank content exploded during or shortly after hot work was performed on the water pipe running above the foul condensate tank. The explosion catapulted the 100,000 gallon tank over a six story building.

Unfortunately the part of the plant, which exploded, did not require a hazard analysis or MoC review to be performed before isolating the tank or performing hot work near it. So to put it bluntly, this was another loss of life due to the company "just following the rules" and using common sense in the application of hazard analysis and MoC review. When will this stop? Read the full CSB report about this event here.

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Erik Bruyn - senior technical professional, upstream, at ExxonMobil asked the audience: "Why can't upgrading a process control system be as easy as getting a new smartphone?" Your old software apps works seamlessly on your new hardware. Often with your customizations preserved through the hardware upgrade.

Modularized Functional Container

The vision with IJH 2.0 is a modularized functional container for software connected to an asset, with control, alarms and cybersecurity built in, and including functionality for startups and shutdowns. An asset could be a distillation column or other piece of equipment. Eric adds: “You should be able to order a pre-engineered module, and modify the standard configuration to what you want.” Cyber-security for access, intrusion detection etc. should be built-in, but configurable.

The new module should also be plug-and-play with your existing graphics displays. No need to upgrade displays just because of a process control hardware upgrade. With the overhead of extra training of operators.

The control componet of IJH 2.0 should be a smart, standard controller that would have an industry-standard, real-time abstraction layer; be auto-binding; run third-party, vendor-agnostic applications; and come in standard enclosures.

Finally on the engineering side there should be a virtualized engineering tool for all automation that supports visualization, simulation, testing, and automated build of functional containers. It would be self-documenting, and come with a smart data interface and a library of prefabricated functional containers.

Why limit the vision to process control?

This to me sound a bit like a vision, which has been inspired by IT companies like Google and facebook. But why not look beyond the it world? From an overall process design and maintenance point of view the vision of IJH should be taken a few steps further to standard size heat exchanger pre-configured with standard instrumentation allowing for both monitoring the process and the equipment for making preventive maintenance possible. And while we are at it: Why limit ourselves to one type of equipment?

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Learnings from the Cyber War Game

1. Mutual assistance doesn’t work for cyber attacks – so don’t count on it.

2. Trained control system cyber security personnel is a highly limited ressouce – so you’re on your own.

3. Isolating the OT networks from the IT networks and the Internet is still not being followed – this has to change or the OT networks will be hit.

4. When you conduct an exercise, then design a scenario to help determine whether you’ve involved the right people in continuity of operations and incident response planning and execution.

5. Malware isn’t the only way to “turn the lights off” - denial-of-service or physics issues can do the same or worse, and they may not be detected by OT network monitoring.

6. Operations expertise is needed to determine electric system risk - it wasn’t readily available during the game.

7. Control system devices, e.g, process sensors, actuators, drives, etc., need to be included in the scope af NERC CIP or NERC Supply Chain because they are critical for keeping lights on, which means expand the Electronic Security Perimeter to include these devices.

Safepark also recommend, that if you are involved in process control, then read Joe Weiss input to the cyber war game here, and about damage to data centers lacking cyber security here.

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There is speculation, that in this event the thives actually cut holes in the pipeline. Pipelines are difficult to protect as they run through uninhabited areas for many miles, and often are not burried. However, it appeas the Pemex - and not just the Mexican government - has a major educational need to educate the general public about the dangers of cutting holes in pipelines and stealing the content.

Unfortunately this is another nail in the coffin of the oil industry, which I years ago were very proud to work in. The negative effect of an explosion like this one goes beyond the company involved. It has impact on the whole industry, and especially the construction of new piplines, which are otherwise one of the safest ways to transport liquid fuel over large distances. It also seems the many negative events at Pemex during the past ten years indicate, that process safety is an afterthought in that company. So I think the question is how can industry internationally ensure companies make pipeline safety a priority?

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Train Accident on Great Belt Bridge in Denmark

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These higher level control applications, e.g. destillation column product quality control, depended on the performance of the button level instrumentation control loops, such as flow control loops and level control loops. In those days part of our job was to tune the lower loops often in collaboration with instrument technicians.

Replacing people with software

Since then most of the team of engineers have gone due to downsizing. So today there are no one to take care of improperly tuned control loops after the commissioning is finished. The result is, at descripted in the PAS webinar, that operators put more loops in manual, which generally give higher variability and hence poorer loop performance. Since the people for loop tuning have been made redundant, it is good news, that you can now get software, that automatically monitor the performance of lower level control loops and recommends improvements. One set of such software tools are ControlWizard and TuneWizard from PAS. However, there are many others, so you may want to read an article in Control Engineering or listen to PAS on-demand webinar on operations risk management here. The above slides are from this webinar.

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Several safety consultants, such as Angela Summers of SIS-TECH, argue that currently on the big players such as ExxonMobil, Shell and DowDupont perform safety at the highest level, but insurers are pushing others in the right direction. And a Calgary company have created a Functional Safety Index, which already is being used to indicate ROI of process safety investments.

Read the whole article here: https://www.controlglobal.com/issues/2018/september/ . Read the latest remarks from Dr. Sam Mannan, the director of the Mary Kay O'connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University, who past away on September 11, 2018.

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The above is another of this programmers offering. An audit tracking chart. It shows open, closed and total audits per department, i.e. three bar charts for what could better be shown on a single stacked bar chart. So again, you are better off creating your own charts for reporting HSE data, and protecting your privacy on LinkedIn.

You properly spend more time collecting your data

Also ask yourself compared with the time you spend collecting your data, how much extra time would it take to create a chart, which convey your message clearly to your audience?

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Today Safepark attended a seminar with Erik Hollnagel and Sidney Dekker with the title "Measuring Safety". Erik Hollnagel, who is currently at Syddansk University, opened the show with a presentation titled "Should safety be measured?" about the difference between safety I and safety II. Safety I is what we have been doing for the past 80 years, that is measuring the absence of safety. This is done by counting things, which are easy to count, such as number of fatalities, number of near miss event (a bit more difficult), number of first aids and other such numbers. However, the events behind these numbers clearly indicate the absence of safety. If safety existed, then no one would die or get hurt. Safety II focus on understanding the work being done. This is much more in line with how performance is measured and improved in professional sports. You measure what is happening, and you try to become the best. To me this is much in line with the ideas of Jens Rasmussen, who used to work at RISØ in Denmark, on analyzing work.

Sidney Dekker started by describing the Australian problem, that many top level people spend almost a quarter of their workweek on compliance with regulations. Clearly that leaves less time for making things safer. Much along the same line is was reported earlier this week, that the average hospital department had to deal with thousands of regulations during their daily work. These regulations take time away from focusing on patients and their needs. So too many rules is not just an Australian problem.

What about counting incidents?

Can safety be measured by counting incidents? The opinion of world-leading safety experts Erik Hollnagel and Sidney Dekker were very clear at today's seminar: No! In order to improve safety you need to focus on the work being done and how it is being done. Erik Hollnagel and Sidney Dekker argued that our well-known and widely implemented measurements tend to be misleading and thus an unfortunate waste of the limited resources dedicated to safety. We tend to measure failures rather than successes, and we focus on what we believe to be precursors of accidents, but rarely are. Are there better and more useful ways of measuring safety?

Erik and Sidney does not say, that we should stop doing PHA, HAZOP, FTA and ETA and all that. They just say that in order to improved safety we need to put more focus on the outcome of the work actually being done. To me, that seem to have parallels in the Japanese approach to quality after WWII guided by Deming and Conway. What do you thing?

Prescriptive Process Safety

- US may move away it

Post date: Jul 11, 2013 12:58:08 PM

In a recent hearing in the US Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works related to the ammonium nitrate explosion in West, Texas and the more recent Williams Olefins explosion the chairperson of the US Chemical Safety Board Rafael Moure-Eraso hinted that a changed approach to process safety could be needed in the USA. At the end of his prepared statement he said that the current situation some of the positives are:

• "Following the Chevron refinery fire last year, and acting on CSB recommendations, California is poised to triple the number of dedicated process safety inspectors ... funded by industry fees.

• Another promising approach is the 'safety case' - successfully used in other nations, which insurers say have much lower petrochemical accidents rates than we do.

• Companies identify and commit to follow the best safety standards from around the world, subject to approval and oversight by a competent, well-funded regulator. Many experts believe this is the best safety regime for complex, technological industries, rather than the US system which calls upon a prescriptive and often outdated rule book."

As a past teacher of risk assessment to chemical engineering students at DTU for more than 10 years I can only agreed. However, it is important that the entities given commercial permits to different activities are aware of the risk involved and know when to ask for advice outside ones own organisation. In my view it is the duty of state legislators to ensure that facilities are covered no mater where they locate themselves.

During the course at DTU groups of students should prepare a safety report according to the EU Seveso II directive including aspects such as site selection, and transportation routes for raw materials and products. The object was not to make them experts at HAZOP, FMEA, ETA or any other tool, but to give them a overview of the complexity and bread of preparing a 'safety case' according to the EU Seveso II directive. The course continue to this day, and I know international students are most welcome. It is my experience that multicultural groups add an extra dimensions to the group work by giving students insights into the different regulatory regimes in different countries around the world.

Safepark Consultancy would be most happy to participate in the development of similar courses for chemical engineering students elsewhere or for groups of professionals from industry or regulators.

What is all the fuss about alarms?

Post date: Jun 27, 2013 1:39:22 PM

In recent years we have gotten an updated EEMUA guide on the design, management and procurement of alarm systems and also new ISA standard on Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries. Both of these documents recommended, that an individual operator is not exposed to more than 300 alarms per day. But what does 300 alarms per day mean?

300 alarms per day means we are asking an operator to solve potentially 300 unique problems each day. That is 12½ unique problems per hour or approximately 1 new problem every 5 minutes! Who in the world can be expected to cope with that kind of a workload? I am pretty sure that I can't. Unless many of the alarms require little or no analysis - and hence in my view should be handled by the automatic process control system (DCS or SCADA) - the requirements of the recent standard and guideline are in my view insane. Even half these numbers could be too much - just imagine an engineer having to work on a new problem every 10 minutes?

So what has happened since these early days of process control computers in the 1980's? My guess is that in many companies the process engineer has been eliminated as a filter of alarms implemented on the DCS or SCADA. This has allowed e.g. equipment vendors to implement alarms on turbines at major power plants - alarms without any required operator action. This should be stopped!

I believe articles such as Kevin Patel's "Managing the Alarms That Manage You" are treating the symptoms in stead of the root cause of too many alarms. However, the ISA standard does provide facility owners with a framework for managing alarms during the whole plant life cycle, just like all other aspects of plant operations.

Why do you perform HAZOP?

- Chevron Richmond Refinery did because they had to!

Post date: Apr 26, 2013 9:46:00 AM

Apparently Chevron perform PHA (HAZOP) just because it has to. One example from the draft report is that the HAZOP of the crude unit did not include corrosion. Another is that Chevron after the rupture event ruched to replace some carbon steel piping in the crude unit without first considering what would be the best replacement material. Or when a unit to remove hydrogen sulfide from the #4-sidecut was removed a MoC was not performed. Neither was a MoC performed when switching to feeding more sulphur rich crudes to the unit.This draft report is also richly illustrated and with many references to relevant literature from both CCPS, API and others. There is a good explanation of abbreviations at the start, and many explanatory footnotes, which makes the report very informative for non-experts. Unfortunately the draft report does not clearly identify the root causes of the release and fire. I hope this will happen in the final report, although it seems clear, that among the root causes are an insufficient mechanical integrity program at the refinery. At another refinery I had the opportunity to visit with a group of university professors about 10 years ago we were told that corrosion measurement points were moved if a particular point did not indicate any corrosion during 3 measurement periods.

The draft report contain 14 (or 20 depending on how one count them) recommendations of which only two are to the company. Of the remaining one is to US EPA and the remaining to authorities in the City of Richmond, the Contra Costa County and the State of California. This distribution of recommendations concerns me. A recommendations usually means that the receiving part have to do some new or extra work. For authorities already under significant economic pressure this is unsustainable. We need to find an approach, to the burden of work after a process safety event is on the company, and not the authorities.

Furthermore any regulation should use shall, and be as broad and general as possible. After all the purpose is simple enough: to ensure no employees or members of the public are harmed by the activities of the company. This is not that different from requiring, that drugs produced and marketed by pharmaceutical companies are safe to use for their intended purpose. After all the purpose of physical design of a refinery is to keep the hydrocarbons inside the process, and the purpose of maintenance is to ensure this continues to be the case.

Functional Modelling

- Safepark continue to be involved!

Post date: Jan 21, 2013 9:04:52 PM

Safepark continues to be involved in functional modeling and in particular MFM. Last november Niels presented ideas on functional alarm design at the International Workshop on Functional Modelling (IWFM) at DTU. The workshop was attended by about 25 researcher involved in functional modeling - some from as far away as Japan and China.

During the fall part of our involvement centered around the synthesis of inorganic reactions using so-called Solvay circles. More information about the results of this effort should be available later this year.

PDF-files with the abstract of Niels Jensen's contribution and his presentation at IWFM are attached below.

The Cyber Threat

- does the process industry understand it?

Post date: Dec 20, 2012 9:15:57 PM

On December 14th Joe Weiss asked on the Control Global Community pages "Another survey says utilities taking cyber security seriously - really?". The background for the question is the so-callled Aurora Vulnerability, which is a threat to electrical distribution grid reliability, which appearantly can be mitigated by a hardware change in the substations. Joe Weiss is questioning if the utilities have really upgraded their substations.

Some years ago I visited a major hospital and had a tour of their ventilation system. That was quite impressed just by the size of the ventilations channels, and the underpressure generated on the doors to these. However, the system was controlled by standard of-the-shelf hardware which quite conveniently included an internet connection. That internet connected saved the technician for many 100 kilometer trips to fix small operational problems at odd hours of the day and on weekends. They simply connected to the ventilation control hardware using another of-the-shelf product: PC Anywhere. However, at the time a single login was shared among all the technicians. I wonder if this has changed today?

I also wonder how many facilities still use software vulnerable to Stuxnet? Many facilities would require a shutdown to upgrade software on critical hardware. For some that shutdown window has yet to appear. Today I also learned about some malware in the Middle East which erase all non C: partitions on the Windows computers it finds itself on.

Cyber threats are really annoying, since they require you to change how you work on a day to day basis, and you never know if you have stopped anything. For example you may need to establish special procedure for getting data from the process control network to the business network for e.g. performance analysis, design debottleknecking etc.

Have you ever heard about mainframe virus or mainframe malware? Maybe the exist in a laboratory somewhere, but their development and deployment would require Stuxnet like efforts. Have you considered a mainframe solution for your plant? Some did in the 1970's. They are now extending the life of their more than 30 year old investment. That is they have been running the same process control computer for more than 30 years! What other computer systems can provide that length of service?

Today you can actually get a mainframe with one or more extenders. So you naturally place the mainframe in or close to your head office (or other protected environment) and then extenders in each of your major plants. The extender can run both Windows and Linux software. Now the trick is to ensure there is no connections to your extenders except form your process control system - and that this system don't have any direct internet connections. Then there is a safe data channel from the process to the head office mainframe, where the process data could be used for optimization, performance monitoring using complex models, etc. Since the Windows and Linux systems on the extenders are isolated from the internet, there should be no need to regularly patch them with security upgrades.

Well, at the moment there is a small problem with the concept described here: The mainframe and the extender currently have to be rather close to each other. That currently rules out the mainframe solution, but the basic idea of a secure data channel from the process to computers for optimization, etc. could properly be implemented with other means. The concept is based on secure data delivery from plant to user, and no internet connection directly to any part of the process control systems.

Will such a structure eliminated the cyber threat? Only if you can prevent your engineers from using random USB-drives to transport process data away from the process control network. For this to be a reality you would to provide the engineers with another easy means for access to the necessary process data. That I think is possible!

Failure is NOT an option!

- upgrade of DCS on a running plant

Post date: Dec 14, 2012 8:15:04 PM

A recent article on ControlGlobal "DCS Migration: Failure is not an option!" reminded me on a simple upgrade of a Honeywell DCS during my time in the Canadian petrochemical industry. The plant had been running for a number of years using the PMX variant of Honeywells DCS at the time, and our team of control and system engineers at the time had the attitude: if it is not broken, then don't fix it. The result was, that after half dozen years of operation an upgrade of the PMX software had become unavoidable. Unfortunately business was doing well, and there was no window long enough to bring down the computer control system, upgrading and testing the new software and including our local add-ons, and restarting the system with all computer control strategies operational. Failure was not an option.

Since we were in the lucky situation, that the control computer room had enough empty floor space to stage a second PMX computer control system, it was decided to do that. That is to buy a new PMX computer system, install the software including our local patches and our computer control applications on this system, and then do a fast switchover from the old PMX system to the new PMX system. This was successfully done with minimal impact on process operations - except for some temporary postponement of computer control application improvements to after the upgrade.

That was more then twenty years ago. Long since the PMX system have been replaced with current generation Honeywell process control systems.

Laboratory safety presentation

at conference in Lodz, Poland

Post date: Nov 28, 2011 9:00:23 AM

Last week the 1st International Conference on Modern management standards of Occupational Safety and Health took place in the city of Lodz in central Poland. Niels was invited to give a key note talk on laboratory safety titled "A sandbox - risk assessment in experimental research". The presentations featured forms for risk assessment of chemicals (Chemical APV Form - see below) and risk assessment of experimental setup (Laboratory ExpSetup Risk Assessment - see below). These forms are based on input from industry, and have been used for a number of years in a university environment.

The conference on Wednesday, November 23rd featured simultaneous translation between Polish and English. The first session on day one were "Occupational safety and health management as a system including law regulation and control institutions", which included presentations from the National Labour Inspectorate in Poland on accident prevention and from the University of Lodz on psychosocial threats in the working environment. The second session was "Role of education ub forming proper OSH attitudes" was dominated by presentations from the University of Lodz, while the third session "Psychological and physiological aspects of occupational safety" featured an excellent presentation by professor Teresa Makowiec- Dabrowska from the Nofer Institute of Occupational Medicine.

The second day featured visits to one of two local companies: Sonoco Poland - Packaging Services or Flextronics Logistics Poland. Niels visited Flextronics, which is part of a major international corporation involved in logistics as well as assembly and repear of electronics. The tour of the warehouse showed, that the degree of automation is not as high as in comparable facilities in Denmark and other western European countries. Niels wonders what the long term prospects of such manually operated warehouses are?

The next Conference on Modern management standards of Occupational Safety and Health is planed to take place on 17. - 18. September 2013 in Lodz, Poland. Further information at www.mordernsafetystandards.com.

Process Safety Competence

Presentations at special session at ECCE-8

Post date: Oct 7, 2011 7:37:55 PM

The two day special session on "Process safety competence - European strength degrading to weakness" at ECCE-8 in Berlin included the following presentations:

• "Avoiding accidents - process safety competence could make the difference" was the title of the keynote by Dr. Mauel Gomez, who is director of recommendation at the US Chemical Safety Board in Washington, DC.

• "Competence - concepted introduction form a pedagogic and scientific point of view" was the title for the first presentation delivered by professor P Dehnbostel from the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg.

• "Universities teaching process and plant safety - the European map" was the second presentation by Niels Jensen from Slangerup, Denmark.

• "Process and plant safety - ProcessNet's curriculum recommended to universities" was the titel of J. Schmidt presentation after lunch. Dr. Schmidt is with BASF in Ludwigshafen and Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.

• "Safety competence - key insights from a study of the Dutch situation" was the titel of Dr. Hans Pasman's presentation. Dr. Pasmas represented the Council of Harzardous Substances due to be disbanded by the government in the following week.

• "How to achieve high quality teaching in higher education? General approaches applied to the field of process and plant safety" was the titel of professor J. Steinbach's presentation. Dr.Steinbach is with the Technical University of Berlin.

• "Leading form the top in making process safety competence a reality" was the titel of talk delivered by Lee Allford of the EPSC on behalf of Dr. D. Brown of the Institution of Chemical Engineers in Rugby, UK.

• "Process safety competence management" was the titel of the first presentation after the coffee break by Dr. Paul Delanoy of the Dow Chemical Company in Norfolk, UK.

• "Promoting process safety competency - work of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)" was the titel of the talk given by Louisa Nara of the CCPS in New York.

• "The DECHEMA approach to process and plant safety knowledge transfer" was the titel of the presentation by Dr. A. Förster from DECHEMA in Frankfurt.

• "Promoting Incident prevention - decades of experience to share" was the titel of the presentation by Dr. G. Uhlmann from Berufgenossenschaft der chemischen industrie (BG Chemie) in Malkammer.

• "Teaching safety in chemical engineering - what, how and who?" was the titel of professor Martin Pitt's keynote as the start of the second days session. Professor Pitt is from University of Sheffield in UK.

• "Process and plant safety competence - the authorities view" was the titel of Jan Slijpen's presentation. Jan Slijpen is with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in Utrecht, the Netherlands.

• "Process and plant safety competence - how to sustain the success factor for European chemical industry" was the titel of the presentation by Dr. Peter Schmelzer, who in this connection represented a committee under CEFIC.

• "High process safety competence - an asset to a chemical company" was the title of Dr. H.V. Schwarz presentation after lunch. Dr. Schwarz is with BASF in Ludwigshafen.

• "Process safety through operational management" was the titel of van Roost presentation. van Roost is with Total Petrochemicals in Brussels.

• "Training engineers in safety and risk management: the OECD experience" was the titel of Mr. M. Hallwood's presentation. Mr. Hallwood is with LUBW Landesanstalt für Umwelt, Messungen und Naturschutz in Baden- Würtemberg.

After presentation of the 2011 EPSC Process Safety Award to a German researcher in the field of static electricity the two day special session was rounded off by a panel discussion. The panel included Dr. Hans Pasman, who is currently at the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center in Texas, Prof. Martin Pitt from University of Sheffield, Dr. Norbert Pfeil from BAM, Dr. Peter Schmelzer from Bayer and Ms. C. Schalbe representing an NGO in Brussels. The panel discussion was titled "Process Safety Competence - the way forward".

The organizers of the two day special session on process safety competence promissed to have updated presentations and conclusions from the two day event available on an unspecified website before the end of November this year. Presenters have until the end of October to sanitize their presentations for publication. Further details will be provided here when available.

EFCE WP Loss Prevention web-site

Post date: Feb 6, 2011 8:59:17 PM

The European Federation for Chemical Engineering (EFCE) Working Party on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion (WP Loss Prevention) now has it own web-site at www.wp-lossprevention.eu. Take a look!

Update July 2018

Safepark is no longer active on the Working Party on Loss Preventation and Safety Promotion, and therefore the update and maintenance of the website has been passed on to an active member of the WP. In fact Safepark already at the end of the Symposium in Firenze announced, that we Niels Jensen no longer would be the Danish representative on the WP.

25+ years after Bhopal - have we learned the lesson?

"Properly NOT!" was the answer at LP 2010 in Bruges

Post date: Jun 11, 2010 1:06:18 PM